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OPPOSITION AT THE WATER COOLER: THE TREATMENT OF NON-
PURPOSIVE CONDUCT UNDER TITLE VII’S ANTI-RETALIATION 
CLAUSE 
BY GINA ODERDA* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Imagine that you are an employee at a mid-sized company.  While at work 
one day, you decide to take a quick coffee break.  As you enter the break room, 
you run into your coworker, Carolyn.  Carolyn is a good friend of yours and you 
decide to take some time to catch up with her.  After making some small talk, 
the tone of the conversation changes, and although people are walking in and 
out of the room, Carolyn quietly tells you that she has heard that your manager 
has been making unwanted advances and derogatory sexual comments toward 
one of your coworkers.  Carolyn tells you that the whole situation makes her a 
little uncomfortable and that she is interested to see how it plays out.  Carolyn is 
subsequently fired after the conversation makes its way back to your manager 
through a bystander.  Should Carolyn be protected for opposing her employer’s 
discriminatory conduct or is this a situation where Carolyn did not properly 
oppose the discrimination, and thus is not protected from being fired? 
In enacting Title VII, Congress sought to prevent discrimination based on 
sex, race, national origin and religion in the workplace.1  To prevent 
discrimination claims from being deterred,2 Congress included an anti-
retaliation provision in Title VII.3  This provision prohibits employers from 
retaliating against an employee for opposing discrimination (the “opposition 
clause”) or for participating in a Title VII investigation, proceeding or hearing 
(the “participation clause”).4  While the opposition clause has been construed 
broadly,5 Justice Alito recently raised the issue of whether opposition needs to 
be made with the purpose of opposing discriminatory conduct for it to be 
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 1. 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)-(2) (2009). 
 2. Heuer v. Weil-McLain, 203 F.3d 1021, 1023 (7th Cir. 2000). 
 3. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-(3)(a) (2009). 
 4. Id. 
 5. Brief of the National Employment Lawyers Ass’n et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of 
Petitioner at 15–16, Crawford v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville, 129 S. Ct. 846 (2009) (No. 06-
1595). 
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protected under the anti-retaliation provision.6  Alito was particularly concerned 
that if the opposition clause were read to protect non-purposive conduct, the 
trend of rapidly increasing retaliation claims would continue.7  Although Alito 
clearly indicated that he thought only purposive opposition should be protected 
under the opposition clause, he acknowledged that it remains undecided 
whether non-purposive conduct is protected as well. 
So, in the previously discussed situation, should Carolyn’s discussion of 
the harassment be protected under the opposition clause?  Was Carolyn’s 
conversation by the water cooler done with the purpose of opposing 
discriminatory conduct or was it simply workplace gossip?  Would it matter if 
the conversation had taken place in Carolyn’s office rather than in a common 
area?  What if, rather than being a coworker, you were one of Carolyn’s 
supervisors?  Although the opposition clause has been construed broadly, it 
remains unclear if Carolyn would, or should, be protected from retaliation by 
her employer. 
Alito suggests that unless opposition is active and purposive, it should not 
be protected under the anti-retaliation provision.8  To implement this standard, 
the Court would need to ascertain Carolyn’s intent in opposing the conduct in 
order to determine whether her discussion was in fact purposive.  Was Carolyn 
engaging in water-cooler gossip or was she opposing her manager’s sexual 
harassment?  This is a difficult question, and until it is answered, both 
employees and employers have little notice of what kind of opposition is 
protected. 
While Alito may be correct in making purposive versus non-purposive 
conduct the dividing line, courts will need to be careful about how they choose 
to determine purpose.  Because of the difficulties courts have faced in trying to 
ascertain intent, it is necessary to have an objective test that will ultimately show 
whether the opposition was purposive.  A test that clearly sets out factors to be 
used in determining what opposition is protected would enable employers to 
know when they can and cannot take adverse action against an employee.  
Additionally, this test would allow employees who may be afraid to oppose 
discriminatory conduct to know what factors courts would consider in 
determining the scope of the opposition clause, thus allowing the employee to 
communicate his or her opposition in a way that will be protected.  Although 
there are several ways that courts could try to determine purpose, this note 
proposes that courts should consider whether the communication was 
reasonably calculated to put the employer on notice of the discrimination.  This 
test would not only offer guidance as to what conduct is protected, but would 
also protect the employer’s interest by offering an opportunity to fix the 
problem. 
 
 6. Crawford v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville, 129 S. Ct. 846, 855 (2009) (Alito, J., 
concurring). 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. at 854. 
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II. BACKGROUND 
Congress enacted Title VII in response to the recognition that widespread 
discontent and discrimination were negatively affecting the country.9  Title VII 
intended to “eliminate all practices which operate to disadvantage the 
employment opportunities of any group protected by [it].”10  Although the 
statute did not originally include sex as a protected characteristic,11 opponents of 
Title VII demanded inclusion of sex to prevent its enactment,12 thus leading Title 
VII to protect discrimination based on sex, religion, race, or national origin.13  
Yet even with the addition of sex, Title VII passed and has had a significant 
impact on employment in the United States ever since.14 
A. Title VII and Sexual Harassment 
Prior to Title VII’s passage, employment was almost always on an at-will 
basis, and employees could be fired at any time for any reason.15  Enacted as 
part of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VII changed this traditional practice by 
restricting an employer’s ability to terminate an employee at-will if the 
termination was based on the employee’s status as a member of a protected 
class.16  Additionally, Title VII prohibits employers from discriminating against 
members of a protected class in hiring, compensation and the terms and 
conditions of employment.17 
In its initial stages of development, Title VII was drafted to protect minority 
employees who had long suffered exclusion from job opportunities.  However, 
by the time Title VII passed, it had expanded to protect individuals from being 
discriminated against because of their sex.18  This protection was interpreted to 
encompass more than just overt discrimination and to protect individuals from 
 
 9. Cheryl Krause Zemelman, The After-Acquired Evidence Defense to Employment Discrimination 
Claims: The Privatization of Title VII and the Contours of Social Responsibility, 46 STAN. L. REV. 175, 189 
(1993). 
 10. McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 280 (1976). 
 11. Jeff Mitchell, Title VII’s “Sex Life”, 24 WOMEN’S RIGHTS L. R. 137, 137 (2003). 
 12. Id. 
 13. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2009). 
 14. Id. 
 15. Deborah A. Ballam, Employment-at-Will: The Impending Death of a Doctrine, 73 AM. BUS. L.J 
653, 653 (2000). 
 16. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2009). 
 17. Id.  Title VII states that: 
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer— 
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate 
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of 
employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or 
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any way 
which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or 
otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual’s race, 
color, religion, sex, or national origin. 
 18. Brianne J. Gorod, Rejecting “Reasonableness”: A New Look at Title VII’s Anti-Retaliation 
Provision, 56 AM. U.L. REV. 1469, 1476 (2007). 
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sexual harassment in the workplace.19  Sexual harassment claims are generally 
analyzed as either quid pro quo claims or hostile work environment claims.20  
Quid pro quo harassment is that which “involves the conditioning of concrete 
employment benefits on sexual favors,”21 whereas hostile work environment 
harassment “[does] not affect[] economic benefits, [but] creates a hostile or 
offensive work environment.”22  Hostile work environment harassment was not 
recognized until 1986, when the Supreme Court held that although an employee 
had not suffered economic or tangible harm, her supervisor’s unwanted 
fondling, sexual demands and forcible rape were sufficient to constitute sexual 
harassment.23  Because the prohibition against sex-based discrimination was 
added as a last minute attempt to defeat Title VII’s passage, there is little 
legislative history to guide courts on how to interpret the prohibition.24  
Therefore, case law guides the interpretation and treatment of sexual 
harassment.25 
B. Title VII’s Anti-Retaliation Provision 
The anti-retaliation provision was added to Title VII as a means to secure 
the statute’s principle objective of a discrimination-free workplace by 
“preventing an employer from interfering (through retaliation) with an 
employee’s efforts to secure or advance enforcement of the Act’s basic 
guarantees.”26  The provision states that: 
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate 
against any of his employees or applicants for employment . . . because he has 
opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by [Title VII], or 
because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner 
in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under [Title VII].27 
In order to successfully achieve the goal of preventing employers from 
retaliating against those employees seeking Title VII’s protections, the 
provision’s clauses (known as the “opposition clause” and the “participation 
clause”) have been interpreted to provide broad protection for protestors of 
discrimination,28 although the participation clause’s protection is limited by the 
provision’s enumerations.29  In order to be protected by the anti-retaliation 
provision, an employee’s conduct must be covered by the opposition clause or 
the participation clause.  While the opposition clause has been interpreted 
 
 19. Amanda Helm Wright, From the Factory to the Firm: Clarifying Standards for Blue-Collar and 
White Collar Sexual Harassment Claims Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 
1085, 1088 (2001). 
 20. Id. 
 21. Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 62 (1986). 
 22. Id. 
 23. Meritor Savings, 477 U.S. at 60. 
 24. Id. at 63–64. 
 25. Mitchell, supra note 11, at 137. 
 26. Burlington Northern v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 63 (2006). 
 27. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2009). 
 28. See Burlington Northern, 548 U.S. at 65. 
 29. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). 
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broadly, its scope is far from clear.  Because neither the wording nor the 
legislative history of the provision make it clear how much the opposition clause 
is meant to protect, courts have been left to develop their own definition of 
protected opposition.30 
In order to make a retaliation claim, an employee must show that (1) the 
employee participated in a protected activity (either opposing discrimination or 
participating in a statutory complaint process); (2) the employer took adverse 
action against the employee; and (3) there is a causal connection between the 
employee’s protected activity and the adverse action.31  To be considered a 
protected activity, the employee’s opposition must be based on a reasonable 
good faith belief that the employer’s conduct constitutes a Title VII violation, 
regardless of whether the opposed conduct actually violates Title VII.32  
Furthermore, the opposition must be reasonable and not overly broad, 
ambiguous or disruptive.33 
Notwithstanding the above requirements, courts have generally interpreted 
the opposition clause fairly broadly, so as not to disincentivize employees from 
utilizing Title VII’s protections.34  Complaints to supervisors, whether they be 
formal or informal, have been protected,35 as have complaints to coworkers as 
long as those complaints are communicated to the management.36  Informal 
protests (as long as they are not disruptive) and voicing one’s opinions in order 
to bring attention to the discriminatory conduct have also been protected.37  
Additionally, the opposition clause generally covers opposition to 
discrimination against a third party.38 
While case law guides us as to what specific cases of opposition might be 
covered, Justice Alito’s concurrence in Crawford v. Metropolitan Government of 
Nashville raises the still unanswered issue of whether non-purposive conduct is 
covered by the opposition clause.39  Although Alito may be correct in asserting 
that only purposive behavior should be covered, leaving courts to determine an 
individual’s purpose in opposing discrimination may be problematic. 
III. CLARIFYING THE PURPOSIVE VERSUS NON-PURPOSIVE DISTINCTION WITH A 
“REASONABLY CALCULATED COMMUNICATION TEST” 
In his concurring opinion, Justice Alito suggests that in determining the 
scope of the opposition clause, the line should be drawn at whether the 
 
 30. Hochstadt v. Worchester Found. for Experimental Biology, 545 F.2d 222, 230 (1st Cir. 1976). 
 31. U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), Compliance Manual on 
Retaliation § 8-II B (1998). 
 32. Clark County Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 270 (2001) (per curiam). 
 33. U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), Compliance Manual on 
Retaliation § 8-II B (1998). 
 34. See Burlington Northern v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 63–64 (2006). 
 35. See, e.g., Ray v. Henderson, 217 F.3d 1234, 1240 n.3 (9th Cir. 2000). 
 36. Niederlander v. Am. Video Glass Co., 80 F. App’x. 256, 261 (3rd Cir. 2003). 
 37. Laughlin v. Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority, 149 F.3d 253, 259 (4th Cir. 1996). 
 38. Ray, 217 F.3d at 1240 n.3. 
 39. 129 S. Ct. 846, 855 (2009). 
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opponent’s conduct was purposive.40  He wrote his concurrence in order “to 
emphasize [his] understanding that the Court’s holding does not and should not 
extend beyond employees who . . . engage in analogous purposive conduct.”41  
Alito expressed concern that allowing non-purposive conduct to be protected by 
the opposition clause would increase the number of retaliation claims brought 
against employers and would further tie employers’ hands.42  While further 
defining the scope of the anti-retaliation clause may help to slow this increase in 
claims, Justice Alito’s purposive versus non-purposive dividing line may be 
problematic if courts are not provided with the proper mechanism to ascertain 
purpose.  In deciding what opposition is protected, rather than simply 
determining intent without clear guidance, courts should look to whether the 
communication was reasonably calculated to put the employer on notice, thus 
giving an employer an opportunity to stop the discrimination. 
A. The Need for an Objective Test 
Unless courts are provided with an objective test offering guidance for 
determining purpose, using purposive conduct as the dividing line would be 
problematic for a number of reasons.  First, asking courts to determine whether 
the conduct was purposive without providing a clear, objective test would leave 
courts trying to determine intent with little guidance, a task which is notoriously 
difficult.  Second, because the opposition clause has been interpreted broadly,43 
retaliation claims are increasing rapidly.44  Requiring plaintiffs to show that the 
communication was reasonably calculated to put the employer on notice in 
order to be considered purposive would tighten the parameters of the 
opposition clause and possibly slow down the rate at which retaliation claims 
are being brought.  Third, courts have emphasized the desire that employers be 
put on notice of discrimination and given the opportunity to fix the problem 
before a claim is brought.45  While requiring that a plaintiff’s conduct be done 
with the purpose of opposing discrimination could result in an employer 
becoming aware of discrimination, this may not always be the case.  Requiring 
that purposive opposition be done in a way that is meant to put an employer on 
notice would make it extremely likely that the employer is on notice and given 
 
 40. Id. at 853. 
 41. Id. 
 42. See id. at 854–55. 
 43. Brief for Petitioner at 15–16, Crawford v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville, 129 S. Ct. 846 (2009) 
(No. 06-1595). 
 44. See U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Charge Statistics: FY 1992 Through 
FY 1996, http://www.eeoc.gov/stats/charges-a.html (last visited Mar. 5, 2009); see U.S. Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission, Charge Statistics: FY 1997 Through FY 2007, http:// 
www.eeoc.gov/stats/charges.html (last visited Mar. 5, 2009). 
 45. See Brief for Petitioner at 42, Crawford v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville, 129 S. Ct. 846 (2009) 
(No. 06-1595) (discussing that employees may forfeit damages if they fail to take advantage of 
preventative opportunities provided by an employer as well as the loss of an affirmative defense for 
employers who know about harassment but fail to prevent its recurrence); Faragher v. City of Boca 
Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 806 (1998) (discussing need to incentivize employers to prevent discrimination); 
Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998) (holding that an employer is vicariously liable 
for a supervisor’s harassment when the employer knew about the conduct but did not take steps to 
prevent recurrence of harassment). 
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an opportunity to remedy the situation.  Finally, requiring that purposive 
conduct be communicated in a way that is reasonably calculated to put the 
employer on notice would further serve the desire to balance an employee’s 
opposition against an employer’s need to maintain a stable work environment.46 
Unless courts follow an objective test for determining purpose, drawing the 
line at purposive versus non-purposive opposition would leave plaintiffs with 
the difficult task of proving intent and employers with the undesirable task of 
determining intent with little direction.  Generally, courts will determine intent, 
the “secret, silent operation of someone’s mind,” by considering all facts and 
circumstances surrounding the incident.47  The lack of an objective test leaves 
courts with little guidance to figure out what was going on in an individual’s 
mind.  Additionally, trying to prove intent as a plaintiff is equally difficult, as 
the plaintiff is left to point to extrinsic factors to convince a court of his or her 
motivations.48  Although a plaintiff will still need to use extrinsic factors to show 
purpose under the reasonably calculated communication test, having a test that 
clearly sets out the factors to be considered will allow plaintiffs to communicate 
opposition in a way that plainly indicates purpose and thus reduces the 
difficulty of showing intent. 
Leaving courts to look at the totality of the circumstances to determine 
purpose leaves employers with little guidance as to what type of opposition is 
protected.  While a court might find that an individual was acting with the 
purpose of opposing conduct in a certain situation, it is unlikely that this will 
help an employer determine whether his own employee’s conduct is purposive.  
Instead, the employer is left to determine an employee’s motivations before 
being able to take any action against an employee.  This ties employers’ hands 
and fails to give adequate weight to an employer’s desire to maintain internal 
discipline and a stable work environment.49  By requiring that an individual’s 
opposition be communicated in a way that puts an employer on notice, courts 
would have guidance as to what objective manifestations of intent need to be 
considered in determining whether conduct is purposive and employers would 
be able to look to courts’ treatment of these factors as guidance as to what type 
of employee conduct will be considered protected opposition. 
Looking at whether the employee made the communication in a way that 
was calculated to put the employer on notice also serves to narrow the 
parameters of the opposition clause.  While the opposition clause has been read 
broadly in order to incentivize employees to utilize Title VII’s protections,50 the 
increasing number of retaliation claims brought each year51 suggest that courts 
 
 46. Gonzalez v. Bolger, 486 F. Supp. 595, 601 (D.C. Cir. 1980). 
 47. Nelson v. Scully, 672 F.2d 266, 269 (2d Cir. 1982). 
 48. MICHAEL K. BROWN, ET AL., WHITEWASHING RACE: THE MYTH OF A COLOR-BLIND SOCIETY 179 
(Univ. Cal. Press 2003) (2003). 
 49. Gonzalez, 486 F. Supp. at 601. 
 50. Burlington Northern, 548 U.S. at 63–64. 
 51. See U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Charge Statistics: FY 1992 Through 
FY 1996, http://www.eeoc.gov/stats/charges-a.html (last visited Mar. 5, 2009); see U.S. Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission, Charge Statistics: FY 1997 Through FY 2007, http:// 
www.eeoc.gov/stats/charges.html (last visited Mar. 5, 2009). 
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may have misinterpreted the clause too broadly on behalf of plaintiffs and at the 
expense of employers. 
Some may argue that because the opposition clause is meant to be read 
broadly,52 construing it slightly more narrowly would place too much weight on 
the employer’s interest and the employee will suffer because of it.  While this is 
a valid concern, the Supreme Court’s decision in Faragher v City of Boca Raton53 
emphasized the need to protect employers’ interests as well as employees’ 
interests, even if that may slightly narrow employees’ protections.  There, the 
Court stated that if a plaintiff fails to utilize an employer’s preventative or 
remedial mechanisms, she may not recover damages that could have been 
avoided had she availed herself of the mechanisms.54  If the employee could 
have avoided harm altogether by utilizing these mechanisms, the employer 
should not be liable.55  This is just one example of the Court limiting an 
employee’s protections to ensure that employers were given a reasonable 
opportunity to learn about the discrimination or harassment and remedy the 
situation.56  While requiring that purposive opposition be reasonably calculated 
to put the employer on notice may tighten the scope of the opposition clause, 
this slight narrowing of the clause’s parameters will incentivize employees to 
communicate conduct in a way that puts employers on notice of the improper 
conduct and gives employers an opportunity to remedy the situation.  Because 
the primary purpose of Title VII is to avoid harm rather than to provide redress, 
it is far better that employers be given, and take, the opportunity to end 
harassment and remedy the situation, rather than have the issue brought to 
court.57 
Congress intended that when an employee opposes discriminatory 
conduct, it would be because the employee is seeking that the employer stops 
the conduct and prevent its recurrence.58  Courts interpreting the scope of the 
opposition clause have tended to protect opposition that puts an employer on 
notice so that the employer has an opportunity to put an end to the 
discrimination.  Formal and informal complaints made directly to a supervisor 
are a clear example of opposition communicated in a way that puts an employer 
on notice.  Both of these types of opposition have been protected under the 
opposition clause.59  By requiring that opposition be communicated to the 
employer, courts have consistently recognized the importance of putting an 
 
 52. See Burlington Northern, 548 U.S. at 63–64. 
 53. 524 U.S. 775, 807 (1998). 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
 56. See also Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998). 
 57. See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 806 (1998) (discussing need to incentivize 
employers to prevent discrimination); Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998) (holding 
that an employer is vicariously liable for a supervisor’s harassment when the employer knew about 
the conduct but didn’t take steps to prevent recurrence of harassment). 
 58. Brief for Petitioner at 41, Crawford v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville, 129 S. Ct. 846 (2009) (No. 
06-1595). 
 59. See, e.g., Ray v. Henderson, 217 F.3d 1234, 1240 n.3 (9th Cir. 2000). 
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employer on notice.60  Other forms of opposition that might not initially appear 
to be protected at first glance may actually be protected because they were 
communicated directly to the employer.  The court in Hertz v. Luzenac Am. Inc. 
held that an employee who lost his temper and shouted at his supervisor in 
front of other employees about discriminatory comments was protected by the 
opposition clause.61  In another context, an employee who asked a supervisor 
whether she had been prevented from acquiring seniority because of her race 
was protected under the opposition clause even though this conduct was not 
what one typically considers opposition, as on its face it is merely an inquiry.62  
If the court had decided this case based on whether the opposition was 
purposive, it very well may have come out the other way.  But, if the court used 
the reasonably calculated communication test as a way to ascertain purpose, the 
opposition likely would have been protected.  These cases reflect a recognition 
of the importance of communicating opposition in a way that puts the employer 
on notice and gives the employer a chance to prevent the continuation of 
discrimination. 
Ultimately, in interpreting the scope of the opposition clause, it is crucial 
that the interests of the employee be weighed against the interests of the 
employer.63  In acknowledging that employers’ interests necessarily shape the 
scope of an employee’s protection, courts have embraced a balancing test in 
their analysis of the opposition clause.64  Opposition may not be protected if it is 
damaging to an employer’s business goals65 or if it infringes on the employer’s 
ability to maintain a harmonious and efficient operation.66  This is not to say that 
an employer’s interest in avoiding the cost and disruption that often accompany 
opposition should outweigh an employee’s right to Title VII’s protection,67 but 
this interest must be acknowledged and taken into account in determining when 
opposition is protected.68 
By using a test that focuses on employer notice to determine the employee’s 
purpose, courts will be giving adequate weight to the employer’s interests, 
while leaving the scope of the opposition clause sufficiently broad to protect 
employees’ interests.  Additionally, looking at employer notification as the 
indicator of whether conduct is purposive advances the employee’s interest of 
working in a discrimination-free environment.  While acknowledging that 
 
 60. Niederlander v. Am. Video Glass Co., 80 F. App’x. 256, 261 (2003) (holding that complaints 
to coworkers are protected but only if they are communicated to the employer). 
 61. 370 F.3d 1014, 1021-22 (10th Cir. 2004). 
 62. Holsey v. Armour & Co., 743 F.2d 199, 210–11 (4th Cir. 1984). 
 63. See CHRISTOPHER A. ANZALONE, SUPREME COURT CASES ON GENDER AND SEXUAL EQUALITY: 
1787-2001, 186 (2d ed. 2002) (discussing how the Supreme Court’s emphasis on business necessity in 
disparate impact cases and legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons in disparate treatment cases 
results from the Court’s acknowledgement that Title VII demands balance between an employee’s 
rights and an employer’s prerogative). 
 64. Brian J. Kreiswith, Justifiable Limitations on Title VII Anti-Retaliation Provisions, 107 YALE L.J. 
2339, 2342 (1998). 
 65. See, e.g., Mozee v. Jeffboat, Inc., 746 F.2d 365, 373–74 (7th Cir. 1984). 
 66. Silver v. KCA, Inc., 586 F.2d 138, 141 (9th Cir. 1978). 
 67. Elizabeth Chambliss, Title VII as a Displacement of Conflict, 6 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 1, 
21 (1997). 
 68. Hochstadt v. Worchester Found. for Experimental Biology, 545 F.2d 222, 233 (1st Cir. 1978). 
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employees’ rights must be protected, Congress has expressed a manifest desire 
that employers’ hands not be tied in the selection and control of employees.69  By 
employing a test that would leave employers with little guidance as to how to 
determine an employee’s intent in opposing conduct, employers’ hands would 
be unnecessarily bound, which clearly goes against Congress’ intent. 
If courts are left to ascertain plaintiffs’ purpose without guidance, 
employees may be able to take advantage of this ambiguity in the rule by 
claiming to have opposed discriminatory conduct as a way to prevent an 
employer from taking action.  The Supreme Court tried to avoid this problem in 
Clark County School District v. Breeden.70  In Breeden, a group of employees, 
including the plaintiff, was assigned to review job applicants’ psychological 
evaluation reports.71  One of the applicant’s files contained a comment that the 
applicant had made to a co-worker (“‘I hear making love to you is like making 
love to the Grand Canyon’”), which was read out loud.72  The plaintiff’s 
supervisor stated that he did not know what that meant and another co-worker 
told him that he would tell him later, which led both men to start chuckling.73  It 
took the plaintiff nearly two years and six months to file a complaint.74  During 
that time, the employer had been considering transferring the plaintiff.75  While 
the Court held that the plaintiff was not protected because the incident was not 
objectively offensive,76 the timing of the incident and the filing suggested that 
the plaintiff was using the incident to try to prevent the employer from taking 
any action against her.77  Leaving courts and employers without a clear and 
objective test to determine whether opposition is purposive and thus protected 
could lead to an increase in employees using the opposition clause to immunize 
themselves from employer action.  If an employee is aware that an employer has 
been considering transferring or firing him and is aware that the employer will 
need to discern his intent before acting, he could choose to oppose 
discriminatory conduct (assuming there is some conduct to oppose) as a way to 
bind the employer’s hands. 
By using a test that looks at whether the opposition was reasonably 
calculated to put the employer on notice of the discriminatory conduct, many of 
these problems would likely be avoided.  Rather than leaving an employer with 
little direction to determine if the opposition was purposive, the employer 
would be guided by specific factors that would indicate whether the 
communication was calculated to put the employer on notice.78  Additionally, 
adopting a test which tightens the parameters of the opposition clause may help 
slow the rapidly increasing number of retaliation claims.  Finally, requiring that 
 
 69. Chambliss, supra note 67, at 21–22. 
 70. 532 U.S. 268 (2001) (per curium). 
 71. Id. at 269. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. at 271. 
 75. Id at 272. 
 76. Id. at 271. 
 77. Id. at 271–72. 
 78. See infra Part III.B. 
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opposition be reasonably calculated to put the employer on notice will further 
courts’ desire to balance employees’ rights against employers’ interests by 
putting employers on notice,79 and giving the employers an opportunity to 
correct the situation and prevent its recurrence. 
B. Proposed Test 
In order to avoid the potential problems posed by trying to determine a 
plaintiff’s purpose, it is crucial that the factors used to establish whether the 
opposition was reasonably calculated to put the employer on notice be clearly 
set forth so courts, employers, and employees have guidance as to what 
opposition is protected.  First, there are several factors that courts have already 
identified as necessary for protection under the opposition clause.80  These 
include having a good faith belief that the conduct being opposed violates Title 
VII81 and that the opposition is reasonable.82  In addition to those requirements, I 
am proposing that the court look at several other factors.83  First, courts must 
consider to whom the opposition was made.  Next, the way the opposition was 
communicated must be taken into account.  Finally, courts should take into 
account the setting in which the opposition took place.  As with any 
reasonableness standard, it is crucial to specify the reasonable person to whom it 
applies, which for the purposes of this test would be a reasonable employee.  
Using these factors will not always make it immediately clear whether 
opposition is protected, and courts will need to carefully weigh each factor.  
However, by considering these factors rather than the employee’s motivation in 
communicating the opposition, many of the problems articulated above could 
be avoided. 
1. Previously Necessary Components 
There are several well-established components that are necessary for 
opposition to be protected.  The first of these is that the employee must have a 
good faith belief that the conduct constitutes a Title VII violation.84  There is a 
subjective and objective component to the employee’s showing of good faith.  
An employee must show that he or she subjectively believed that the opposed 
conduct violated Title VII, but also that this belief was objectively reasonable.85  
 
 79. See Hochstadt v. Worchester Found. for Experimental Biology, 545 F.2d 222, 233 (1st Cir. 
1978). 
 80. See supra Part II.B (discussing necessary components of a protected activity). 
 81. Clark County Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 270 (2001) (per curiam). 
 82. U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), Compliance Manual on 
Retaliation § 8-II.3.b (1998). 
 83. See infra Part III.B.2. 
 84. Every circuit has interpreted the opposition clause to require a good faith belief that the 
discriminatory conduct violates Title VII.  See Brief for Petitioner at 35 n.45, Crawford v. Metro. 
Gov’t of Nashville, 129 S. Ct. 846 (2009) (No. 06-1595) (citing cases from each of the 12 geographical 
circuits showing that all have interpreted the opposition clause in this manner). 
 85. See, e.g., Payne v. McLemore’s Wholesale & Retail Stores, 654 F.2d 1130, 1140 (5th Cir. 1981); 
Bredeen, 532 U.S. at 270. 
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For the purposes of a retaliation claim, it is irrelevant whether or not the conduct 
actually violates Title VII.86 
In addition to the good faith requirement, courts have consistently required 
that the opposition be reasonable and not overly broad, ambiguous or 
disruptive.87  Although individuals should be able to enjoy the protections Title 
VII offers, courts are only willing to go so far in requiring employers to keep 
hostile and disruptive employees under employment.88  In determining whether 
opposition is reasonable, courts once again apply a balancing test,89 where the 
employee’s interest in securing the protections of Title VII is balanced against 
the employer’s interest in maintaining a stable, productive and harmonious 
workplace.90 
The employer’s interest generally outweighs the employee’s interest when 
the opposition is so disruptive that it interferes with the employer’s legitimate 
business concerns.91  For example, courts have held that communicating 
opposition through a demonstration that interferes with the employer’s 
legitimate business concerns is too disruptive to be considered reasonable and 
thus is not protected by the opposition clause.92  Additionally, opposition that is 
communicated in a way that violates workplace rules, such as dissemination of 
confidential information, may well be too disruptive to be reasonable.93 
Although an employer’s interest in maintaining a workplace that is free of 
disruptions must be given weight, it is important to remember that opposition, 
by its very nature, has the potential to be disruptive.94  Furthermore, if the 
ultimate goal is to put the employer on notice, a higher level of disruption might 
be considered reasonable when the opposition was clearly calculated to put the 
employer on notice.  Consider, for example, an employee whose opposition took 
the form of yelling about the discriminatory conduct.  When this conduct was a 
one-time occurrence and was directed at a supervisor, it was found to be 
reasonable opposition.95  Yet, if this communication had been directed towards 
coworkers, one could argue that it was unreasonably disruptive, regardless of 
whether the opposition is later communicated to the employer, as that 
 
 86. Bredeen, 532 U.S. at 270. 
 87. U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), Compliance Manual on 
Retaliation, § 8-II B (1998). 
 88. See Chambliss, supra note 67, at 21 (discussing the lack of guidance in how far Congress 
meant to allow hostile and disruptive employee conduct). 
 89. Edward A. Marshall, Excluding Participation in Internal Complaint Mechanisms from Absolute 
Retaliation Protection: Why Everyone, Including the Employer, Loses, 5 EMP. RTS. & EMPLOY. POL’Y J. 549, 
561 (2001). 
 90. Id. 
 91. U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), Compliance Manual on 
Retaliation, § 8 iii (1998). 
 92. See, e.g., Pendleton v. Rumsfield, 628 F.2d 102, 107 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (holding that employees 
who held a demonstration in the food area of a military hospital were too disruptive to be protected 
because it could disrupt patients’ feeding). 
 93. See Jefferies v. Harris County Community Action Ass’n, 615 F.2d 1025, 1036 (5th Cir. 1980) 
(holding that an employee who copied and disseminated a confidential personnel form in an effort 
to protest allegedly discriminatory conduct was not protected by the opposition clause). 
 94. Chambliss, supra note 67, at 21. 
 95. Hertz v. Luzenac Am., Inc., 370 F.3d 1014, 1021–23 (10th Cir. 2004). 
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opposition takes a less direct form and does little to contribute to putting the 
employer on notice.  While there may be a slightly higher threshold for 
disruptive opposition that clearly puts the employer on notice, that threshold 
can only go as high as is reasonable when it is weighed against the employer’s 
interest.96 
2. Additional Components 
In addition to the employee’s good faith belief and the reasonableness of 
the opposition, courts should look at to whom it was communicated, how the 
opposition was communicated, and the setting in which the opposition took 
place in order to determine if the opposition was reasonably calculated to put 
the employer on notice of the discriminatory conduct.  By taking these 
additional factors into account, employees will be encouraged to communicate 
their opposition in a way that allows the employer to remedy the situation.  
Thus, the employer’s interest is advanced in a way that does not detract from 
the employee’s interest because, although the employee may need to put a little 
more thought into how he communicates the opposition, he will still be 
receiving the anti-retaliation provision’s protections. 
In determining whether an employee’s opposition was reasonably 
calculated to put the employer on notice, courts should consider to whom the 
opposition was communicated.  Opposition that is directly communicated to a 
superior or supervisor will weigh heavily in favor of the opposition being 
protected.  When the opposition is communicated only to a coworker it becomes 
less clear whether the communication should be protected.  If the opposition is 
communicated to a coworker and subsequently communicated to the employer, 
this would indicate that the opposition was calculated to put the employer on 
notice.  Still, in the case of opposition being communicated only to a coworker, 
courts should give more weight to the other factors of the test to determine if the 
opposition should be protected.  If the opposition is made to someone outside 
the company, this will likely weigh against the opposition being protected.  It is 
hard to imagine a situation in which opposition was communicated to an 
outsider yet still reasonably calculated to put the employer on notice, but if an 
employee was able to show through the other factors that this was in fact the 
case, the opposition would need to be protected. 
In addition to considering to whom the communication was made, courts 
should also give weight to how the communication was made.  The most 
compelling example of making a communication in a way that is calculated to 
put the employer on notice would be a verbal or written complaint that makes it 
clear that the discriminatory conduct is being opposed by the employee.  Such a 
communication, so long as it is communicated to the employer or to coworkers 
and then to the employer, would very likely be found reasonably calculated to 
put the employer on notice.  On the other end of the spectrum, a communication 
made by the employee to other employees that consists of a general complaint 
that is not subsequently communicated to an employer is unlikely to be found 
calculated to put the employer on notice.  Other forms of opposition, such as a 
demonstration (as long as it is not disruptive), letters to supervisors or other 
 
 96. Rollins v. Florida Dep’t of Law Enforcement, 868 F.2d 397, 401 (11th Cir. 1989). 
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superiors, and inquiries to superiors about possible discrimination97 would 
likely be found forms of communication that are calculated to put the employer 
on notice.  As opposition becomes less clear and more passive, the likelihood 
that it would be found calculated to put an employer on notice decreases.  So, if 
an employee opposes discriminatory conduct by refusing to participate in 
activities or complete work assignments, the employee would likely not be 
protected, even if the communication is considered reasonable, because it would 
not appear to be reasonably calculated to put the employer on notice (unless the 
employee is able to point to other factors indicating otherwise). 
Finally, the setting in which the opposition took place should be used to 
determine if the opposition should be protected.  If the opposition was made in 
the workplace, it will weigh in favor of the opposition being protected as 
opposed to if it had been made outside the workplace.  Whether or not 
opposition made in certain areas inside the workplace is protected may depend 
on the nature of the workplace.  For example, if the office is small and informal, 
communicating opposition in a break area that is heavily frequented may weigh 
in favor of protection.  On the other hand, if the workplace is large and formal, 
communicating opposition in a break area might be considered too informal to 
give weight to the notion that the communication was calculated to put the 
employer on notice. 
By applying this new test, many of the problems that would arise without 
clear guidance can be avoided.  Employers would be able to use the factors to 
determine if an employee’s opposition is protected before taking action and thus 
reduce the risk of litigation.  When litigation is unavoidable and a claim makes it 
way to court, there will be clear guidance as to what opposition should be 
protected.  Finally, employees would benefit from this test, in that it would be 
clear what the employee would need to consider before opposing conduct, so as 
to be protected by the opposition clause. 
IV. APPLICATION 
What would the result be for Carolyn, the woman overheard talking to a 
coworker about sexual harassment,98 if courts applied this new test?  The 
conduct Carolyn is opposing, unwanted advances and derogatory sexual 
comments, could reasonably be perceived as a violation of Title VII.  Although a 
court would probably need to look at more extrinsic factors to determine if 
Carolyn meets the good faith belief requirement, it appears that she did have a 
good faith belief that the conduct violated Title VII.  Carolyn’s opposition is not 
broad or ambiguous, but there may be an argument that it is disruptive.  
Although gossip can be insidious, it likely will not be so disruptive as to make 
the opposition unreasonable.  So, although there may be an argument that office 
gossip is disruptive, that does not appear to be true in Carolyn’s case. 
 
 97. As the court held in Holsey v. Armour & Co., asking a supervisor if one was passed up for a 
promotion because of race is a protected objection.  743 F.2d 199, 211 (4th Cir. 1984).  If the employee 
instead posed the question to a coworker, it would likely indicate that the opposition was not 
calculated to put the employer on notice. 
 98. See supra Part I. 
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After meeting these requirements, the court must consider how the 
communication was made.  Here, Carolyn made a verbal statement to a 
coworker expressing her disapproval of the situation.  This is a relatively clear 
expression of Carolyn’s disapproval, but in order for Carolyn’s opposition to be 
purposive, it is necessary to examine the additional factors.  The opposition was 
communicated to a coworker, which in itself is not a problem, but Carolyn’s 
employer was only put on notice because a bystander happened to overhear the 
conversation and then informed her manager.  Here, the setting in which the 
opposition took place will likely be the deciding factor.  Carolyn communicated 
her opposition in the company’s break room.  If this is a smaller, less formal 
workplace where work related discussions often take place in the break room, 
Carolyn might be able to show that this communication was in fact meant to put 
her employer on notice and thus protected.  More likely than not, however, the 
informality of the setting and the fact the opposition was never directly 
communicated to her manager will outweigh the way in which the 
communication was made and indicate that this opposition was not protected. 
Now consider another scenario: David, an employee at the same workplace 
as Carolyn, is working late one night on a team project.  Although most people 
have gone home, David and his supervisor, Barry, are sharing a pizza and 
finalizing their report.  David and Barry, who are friends outside of work, have 
been talking about their families and work, when David asks Barry if he has 
heard anything about another supervisor’s harassment of an employee.  Barry 
replies that he hasn’t and asks David if he knows anything more about it.  David 
says that all he knows it that it has been going on for a little while and some 
employees are really unhappy about it.  The next day, Barry tells his superior 
that David informed him of this harassment and soon after David is demoted.  
Although he is told that the demotion is due to poor work performance, David 
is certain it is because of his conversation with Barry. 
If a court were left trying to determine David’s purposes from the totality 
of the circumstances, his opposition would likely not be protected.  Although 
the communication was made to a supervisor, it appears that the 
communication was made with the purpose of informing rather than opposing.  
But, if a court were to apply a reasonably calculated communication test to 
determine purpose, David’s conduct would be protected. 
First, the communication was made directly to David’s supervisor.  There 
was no intermediary step between the opposition and the employer.  The fact 
that the communication was not disruptive and was made directly to David’s 
supervisor will weigh heavily in favor of the communication being protected.  
The communication was a verbal statement, and although David did not 
expressly state that he opposed the discriminatory conduct, he made clear that 
some of his coworkers did.  Although this communication would weigh more 
heavily in David’s favor if he had stated that he was opposed to the conduct, the 
fact that he was making the opposition for a coworker will not weigh against 
him.  Finally, although it would have been better for David if the 
communication had been made in a more formal setting, this opposition should 
still be protected.  He was at work with a supervisor in a private area when he 
made the opposition.  Because the opposition was made directly to a supervisor, 
it is not necessary that the communication be made somewhere more public.  If 
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it had in fact been made somewhere public, it arguably would have been far 
more disruptive. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Congress offered little guidance as to how broadly the scope of the 
opposition clause should be read.  It is clear that, generally, the opposition 
clause is meant to be read broadly,99 yet it is also clear that the opposition clause 
does not offer absolute protection and that an employer’s legitimate business 
goals must be weighed against an employee’s need to be protected against 
retaliation.100  Courts have been left to determine on a case-by-case basis 
whether each individual instance of opposition is protected.  Justice Alito 
suggested that a line should be drawn between purposive and non-purposive 
conduct.101  While he acknowledged that it is unclear whether non-purposive 
conduct is protected, he was insistent that it should not be.102 
Although Justice Alito suggests a possible standard to address this 
unresolved problem, leaving employers and courts to determine an employee’s 
motivation without guidance raises a number of concerns.  First, looking to the 
purpose behind opposition would be difficult for courts to determine and for 
plaintiffs to show.103  Additionally, because determining purpose would be very 
fact-specific and thus would vary on a case-by-case basis, employers and 
employees would be left with little guidance as to what opposition is protected.  
Finally, while drawing this line would advance the employer’s interest by 
keeping non-purposive opposition outside the scope of the opposition clause, it 
would do little to put employers on notice of the discriminatory conduct and 
thus may not give employers an opportunity to fix the discrimination which is 
being opposed. 
By employing a test that requires that opposition be reasonably calculated 
to put the employer on notice, the type of conduct Justice Alito was concerned 
with will likely be kept out of the scope of protection while avoiding the 
problems addressed previously.  Alito was concerned that the opposition clause 
may eventually be read to protect employees who “never expressed a word of 
opposition to their employers.”104  Because it is unlikely that a plaintiff could 
show that this kind of silent opposition was reasonably calculated to put an 
employer on notice, applying the factors test described above would address 
Justice Alito’s concerns while avoiding the problems created by looking at the 
purpose of the opposition. 
Adopting a test that considers how and to whom the communication was 
made, as well as the setting in which the opposition took place, will help to 
define the parameters of the opposition clause.  Additionally, it will give 
adequate weight to the employer’s interest by putting the employer on notice 
 
 99. See Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 65 (2006). 
 100. Gonzalez v. Bolger, 486 F. Supp. 595, 601 (D.C. Cir. 1980). 
 101. Crawford v. Metropolitan Gov’t of Nashville, 129 S. Ct. 846, 854 (2009) (Alito, J., concurring). 
 102. Id. at 855. 
 103. See BROWN ET AL., supra note 48, at 179 (discussing the difficulty in proving intent and the 
evidence necessary to prove intent). 
 104. Crawford, 129 S. Ct. at 854 (Alito, J., concurring). 
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and giving the employer an opportunity to put an end to discriminatory 
conduct.  Finally, although one might argue that this test would harm plaintiffs 
by narrowing the scope of the opposition clause, employees will have clear 
guidance as to how opposition should be communicated so as to assure the 
communication is protected.  For these reasons, in determining whether conduct 
is purposive, courts should implement the reasonably calculated 
communications test. 
 
